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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DO JURY TRIALS ENCOURAGE HARSH PUNISHMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES?

WILLIAM T. PIZZI*

A.

Introduction: The Right to Trial by Jury in the United States

Because we have a very strong federal system in the United States, many
aspects of our criminal justice system vary considerably from state to state.
Most states have a death penalty, but a few have done away with the death
penalty and a few have never had one. Some states have centralized state-wide
public defender systems to handle the cases of indigent defendants, while other
states rely heavily on the appointment of private attorneys to handle such
cases. In some jurisdictions trial judges are appointed for life, while in other
jurisdictions judges are elected to their office and must seek reelection every
few years.
But when it comes to the importance of the jury in our trial system, there
can be no uncertainty about the role of the jury. Our trial system is heavily tied
to trial by jury. While other western countries, such as England, Denmark and
Norway, use juries, they do so only when the crime is very serious, such as
when the crime is murder, rape or kidnapping. For the vast majority of
criminal cases, the defendant has no right to trial by jury.
But the United States has gone down a different path by requiring juries in
all but the most minor criminal cases. The two most important decisions
demanding that our trial system be centered on juries are Duncan v. Louisiana1
and Baldwin v. New York.2
In 1968, in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court was faced with a state
jurisdiction—Louisiana—which did not provide defendants with a broad right
to a jury trial. Jury trials in Louisiana were restricted to those on trial for the
most serious offenses. The Court in Duncan ruled that due process demands
that states afford defendants the right to a jury trial in all cases in which there
is the possibility of a sentence in excess of a year in prison, what we call felony
offenses in the United States. Parts of Duncan read like a paean to the jury
system:

* Professor of Law, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.
1. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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Providing the accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him
an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the complaint, biased, or eccentric judge . . . . Fear of unchecked
power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.3

Two years after Duncan, in 1970, the Court decided another important case
involving the right to a jury trial, Baldwin v. New York. Baldwin raised the
issue of whether a defendant charged with a rather minor offense which
authorized punishment up to a year in jail must be extended the right to have
the case tried in front of a jury. This is a very important issue in large cities
because the number of such minor cases, which we refer to as misdemeanors,
entering the system each day is tremendous. But the Supreme Court had no
hesitancy in ruling that our Constitution demands that even defendants charged
with a misdemeanor must be guaranteed the right to a jury trial.
What these cases mean for our criminal justice system is that states must
guarantee defendants the right to a jury trial in many cases where there is no
chance that the defendant would actually be sentenced to any prison time if
convicted. For example, first time offenders rarely get any prison time unless
the crime is serious. But the mere possibility of a prison sentence in excess of
six months requires that a defendant be provided the right to a jury trial.4
Whether or not the Court made the right decision in requiring juries in all
state prosecutions when the crime involved is rather minor can certainly be
questioned. While our crime rates have come down in recent years, the United
States criminal justice system still must handle an enormous volume of cases.
In urban areas, any thought that juries could be provided to a substantial
percentage of the minor criminal cases that enter the system each day is
completely unrealistic.
Because jury trials are very expensive, it is easy to imagine forms of trials
that would be less expensive, yet retain the use of citizens in some form.
Among the possibilities would be the use of mixed panels of professional
judges and lay judges such as one sees often on the continent, or perhaps a
system using panels of lay magistrates for minor cases, such as one finds
deciding the vast majority of criminal cases in England. But constitutional
adjudication did not permit the Supreme Court to select among several possible

3. 391 U.S. at 156.
4. Interestingly, the right to counsel has never been extended as far as the right to a jury
trial. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979). This means that many indigents charged
with a misdemeanor will have the right to a jury trial, but will not have counsel to assist them at
the trial.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

DO JURY TRIALS ENCOURAGE HARSH PUNISHMENTS

53

options. Faced with the choice between a trial to a single judge with no lay
participation and trial to a jury, the Court required juries.5
The result is a system that theoretically guarantees defendants a jury trial
for every criminal charge except the most minor, but actually provides jury
trials to very few defendants. Statistics from the Department of Justice for
1996 show that only four percent of those defendants convicted of felonies in
state courts were convicted after a jury trial.6 Instead the overwhelming
majority of those convicted in our criminal justice system have pled guilty as
the result of a plea bargain.
It is the thesis of this article that Duncan and Baldwin, for all the lofty
language about the important role that juries play in protecting citizens from
overzealous prosecutors and compliant judges, have exactly the opposite
effect; they encourage legislatures to place more power than ever in the hands
of prosecutors.
B.

Our Emphasis on Selecting the “Right” Jurors

When confronted with the relative paucity of criminal trials in the United
States, the traditional response of many lawyers and judges is to hide behind
the claim that the system’s overwhelming preference for plea bargaining is
simply a reflection of fiscal realities.
I think this is only part of the reason the system avoids trials. The more
serious problem is that we lack confidence in juries. This lack of confidence
shows itself in many ways. One such way is the elaborate system we have
evolved for selecting the jury. We are very nervous about who gets to sit on
the jury. While it would be comforting to believe that any group of fairminded citizens would reach the same result on the same evidence, I do not
think we believe that in practice. To make this clear, let me give a brief
overview of the jury selection procedure in the United States.
5. In a footnote in Duncan, Justice White acknowledged that a criminal justice system that
was fair and equitable but which did not rely on juries was easy to imagine. 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
Such a system, he observed, would be consistent with due process because it would “make use of
alternative guarantees and protections which would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the
English and American systems.” Id. But White noted that no American state had yet undertaken
to construct such a system. Id.
This footnote leaves open the possibility that a state might construct a criminal justice
system, perhaps on the continental model, which would use mixed panels of professional judges
and lay people, and that such a system would satisfy due process. But it is hard to see how any
state could afford the risk that would be involved in constructing such a system in order to test the
Court’s dicta.
6. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
454, table 5.51 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1999). Obviously, if those charged
with misdemeanors and entitled to jury trial were added to those charged with felonies, one
suspects that the percentage of those convicted after a jury trial would be miniscule.
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While some common-law countries limit jury selection to a few questions
about the nature of the case and the likely witnesses, and provide very little
opportunity to the lawyers to ask questions of the potential jurors, our system
has evolved quite differently. While procedures vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, lawyers typically play a central role in deciding who will sit on the
jury that will decide the case. The reason has to do with the fact that each of
the lawyers at a criminal trial has the right to remove certain prospective jurors
from the jury panel through what are called “peremptory challenges.” The
challenges are called “peremptory” challenges because the tradition is that they
can be exercised peremptorily, meaning that there is no need to explain or
justify these challenges. This is changing a bit as I will explain.
The number of challenges that are allotted to the prosecutor and the
defense attorney varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and will often depend
on the importance of the case. It is not unusual in a burglary or theft case for
each of the lawyers to have five or six challenges which each may use to
remove jurors they would rather not have on the jury.
It is important to point out that these jurors who are being removed from
the jury are not those who have been shown to be too opinionated or biased in
their point of view to be able to view the evidence in a fair and impartial way.
Those jurors are also subject to removal through what we call “challenges for
cause” and there is no limit on such challenges.
Because lawyers are permitted to influence the shape of the jury by
exercising a number of peremptory challenges, they like to have information
on which to base these challenges and they are usually permitted to ask
prospective jurors questions during the jury selection process. Sometimes, to
speed up the process, the prospective jurors will have filled out questionnaires
prior to trial that gives information about each of them. The questionnaires
may ask them for information about matters such as their employment, their
family status, what newspapers and magazines they read, their religion, and
their political affiliation.7 If a defendant happens to be wealthy, which is rarely
the case, there are jury consultants, often trained in social science research,
who can be hired to help select the best jurors, “best” meaning from the point
of view of the defense. These consultants might check the background of
potential jurors or they might do a survey of the community to try to give the
defense a statistical picture by gender, race, age, religion, etc., of those persons
likely to be the favorable or unfavorable jurors. Sometimes a jury consultant
with a background in psychology may also sit in the courtroom in order to

7. It has been reported that a woman who refused to give this sort of information in a
murder case was put in jail for three days for contempt of court. See Questions From the Jury
Pool on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1994, at B18.
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study the body language and manner of speech of a potential juror and thereby
help the trial lawyer determine which jurors should be removed from the panel.
What peremptory challenges mean for our system is that it will often be the
case through the careful use of such challenges that a defense attorney or a
prosecutor can succeed in removing all citizens with a certain background from
the jury if the group of such citizens is small. For example, in a complicated
criminal fraud case, the defense attorney may be able to remove from the jury
any citizen who has graduated from a university or any citizen who is familiar
with business documents. Or in a case involving drugs, the prosecutor may be
able to remove all of the young people from the jury.
When peremptory challenges have been exercised on the basis of race, this
has caused enormous problems in the United States. We have had civil unrest
in cities where the defense attorneys used peremptory challenges to remove all
or almost all black prospective jurors where the victim of a police beating was
black and the police officers were white.8
Perhaps a more typical situation is the use of peremptory challenges by
prosecutors where the defendant is black to remove all black citizens in the
pool of possible jurors. Such a case was Batson v. Kentucky,9 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1986, where the Court tried to limit the use of peremptory
challenges to remove prospective jurors on the basis of race.10 But it is not
easy to enforce this prohibition in practice. Where attorneys can remove
prospective jurors for almost any reason—except solely for the reason of
race—how can a trial judge know whether a particular juror was being
removed on the basis of race?11 Lawyers can always put forward reasons to
remove such jurors that mask the underlying racial motivation.
Given all the problems that jury selection entails in the United States as
well as the tremendous amount of trial time that is devoted to jury selection,
one obvious reform would be to do away with peremptory challenges. It is not
unthinkable—England has done away with peremptories and Justice Marshall
in Batson argued that peremptories should be struck down as unconstitutional.
But this would be a difficult reform to achieve legislatively in the United States

8. See James R. Jorgenson, Back to the Laboratory with Peremptory Challenges: A Florida
Response, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 558, 579-80 (1984). See also Irene Wielawski, Riot Aftermath,
L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at A3.
9. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10. The Court has subsequently extended the decision in Batson to bar peremptory
challenges solely on the basis of gender. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129
(1994).
11. For a case illustrating the difficulties in enforcing the prohibition against using
peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race, see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
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because the belief is so strong among trial lawyers that the composition of the
jury is crucial to the outcome of the case.12
Moreover, jury selection in the United States has to be understood against
our tradition of requiring a unanimous verdict in criminal cases. While this is
not a constitutional requirement, it is a strong part of our tradition and only two
states permit nonunanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases.13 Thus there is
always the worry in the United States about a juror who pretends to be fair and
impartial during jury selection but who has other objectives in getting on the
jury. In my home state, Colorado, to give an example, an employee at my own
university sat on a jury in a drug case and voted to acquit because it was her
view that criminalization of drug use was the wrong way to solve our nation’s
drug problem.14 The jury ended up hung, 11-1, and the case had to be retried.
While the percentage of such cases has never been high, usually the norm has
been about five per cent, it has been reported that this percentage is doubling
and even quadrupling in some locations.15 Some view this as a good thing and
there is even an organization—the Fully Informed Jury Association—that has
been trying to get courts to instruct jurors about their power to nullify the
law.16
C. The Appellate Emphasis on Jury Selection
The emphasis on jury selection in our trial system carries through to our
appellate system as well. Errors in the jury selection process are considered
very serious errors in our legal system and when they occur they often require
a new trial no matter how strong the evidence of guilt was at trial or how fair

12. There have been some efforts to reform the way jurors are treated in state systems. The
state that took the lead in this task was Arizona, which now permits jurors to take notes during
trial and also allows jurors to ask questions of witnesses. See ARIZ. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON
MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, JURORS: THE POWER OF 12, SUMMARY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS, ¶¶ 29, 31, 34 at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/Jury/jury1g2.htm (last
updated Jan. 8, 2002). But one area the reformers did not touch was peremptory challenges. Id.
at ¶ 23, at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/Jury/jury1g1.htm.
13. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (ruling that Oregon law, which
permits conviction by a verdict of 10-2, is not unconstitutional).
14. The case eventually received national attention when the trial judge decided to punish
the juror with contempt after the trial for failing to disclose during jury selection her strong views
on drug laws. See David E. Rovella, Judge: Juror Didn’t Nullify, She Lied, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 24,
1997, at A8; David E. Rovella, A Judge Mulls: Did Juror Lie, or Did She Nullify?, 19 NAT’L L.J.
Oct. 14, 1996; at A9.
15. A recent newspaper article reported that the percentage of juries unable to reach a
unanimous verdict was only five percent thirty years ago but that this rate has doubled and even
quadrupled in some locations. See Joan Biskupic, Activist Jurors Judge the Law: Movement Uses
Jury Box to Work for Social Change, DENV. POST, May 1, 1999, at A25.
16. Id.
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the trial was that the defendant received. For example, consider a Vermont
case, State v. Doleszny.17 In Doleszny, the defendant had been convicted at
trial of a serious crime—sexually assaulting a victim under the age of sixteen.
What troubled the Vermont Supreme Court was an error that occurred even
before the start of trial during jury selection. One of the prospective jurors had
stated that he was acquainted with one of the prosecution witnesses who would
be testifying, a doctor who had examined the victim after the rape. When
asked if he could still be impartial in evaluating the testimony of this witness,
the prospective juror had replied, “I could certainly try to be impartial but I’m
not saying that I could.” Not satisfied with this answer, the defense attorney
had asked to have this juror removed by the trial judge through a challenge for
cause because the juror could not be impartial. But the trial judge had refused
to do so.
In hindsight, this was a mistake and the judge should have been cautious
and removed this juror and the Vermont Supreme Court reversed in a summary
two-page opinion. But what makes the case remarkable is the problem juror
never sat on the jury that convicted Doleszny of sexual assault on a minor.
When the judge had refused the challenge for cause, the defense had removed
the juror using a peremptory challenge. Thus the only effect of the judge’s
error was that the defense ended up with one less peremptory challenge—in
Vermont this meant that the defense had five peremptory challenges instead of
six. Although peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required, it was
clear to the court that the conviction had to be reversed because of the loss of
even a single peremptory challenge.
This is not an odd or isolated case. While not all courts treat the loss of a
peremptory challenge as automatic reversible error,18 courts in states in all
regions of the country, including Florida,19 New York,20 Colorado,21 and
Arizona,22 would automatically reverse convictions in the same situation, no
matter how strong the evidence and how reliable the verdict at trial seems to
be.
I mentioned earlier the difficult task that the Supreme Court imposed on
trial judges in its decision in Batson v. Kentucky which tries to place limits on

17. State v. Doleszny, 508 A.2d 693 (Vt. 1986).
18. See, e.g., State v. Ramos, 808 P.2d 1313 (Idaho 1991). The Supreme Court seems
almost unique among courts confronting this issue as it has reasoned that the loss of a peremptory
challenge due to the trial judge’s failure to remove a juror for cause is not error. See United
States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000). See also William T. Pizzi & Morris
Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1391 (2002).
19. Moore v. State, 525 So. 2d 870, 872-73 (Fla. 1988).
20. People v. Scott, 566 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
21. People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234, 244 (Colo. 1992).
22. State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
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peremptory challenges so that they cannot be used to remove prospective
jurors on the basis of race. But enforcing a rule which says that lawyers can
remove jurors for any reason—poor eye contact with the lawyer, political
affiliation, age, education level, manner of dress, or even the tone of the juror’s
responses—as long as it is not done on the basis of race, is not easy for a trial
judge. But what makes the task especially difficult is that errors in enforcing
the Batson decision can require a new trial.
One example is United States v. Annigoni,23 decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which hears appeals from federal trial
courts in the western part of the United States. This case involved a bank fraud
in California by Annigoni and some associates in which, in the court’s words,
the bank was “duped by false documents” into granting a $2.85 million real
estate loan to Annigoni and his associates. The borrowers promptly defaulted,
leaving the bank to discover that the collateral for the loan did not exist.
During jury selection the defense tried to use a peremptory challenge to
remove an Asian-American who had stated that he had an interest in a real
estate partnership. (Defense lawyers often do not like jurors who have
knowledge and experience that might make them more able to understand
complicated business transactions.) The trial judge refused to permit the
challenge because he felt the challenge was being made on racial grounds. The
court was wrong in this conclusion said the Ninth Circuit. The remedy, said
the court, must be a completely new trial because even a single incorrect denial
of a peremptory challenge in an attempt to enforce Batson constitutes
automatic reversible error. There was no attempt by the court to determine
whether the trial Annigoni received was fair and whether the evidence
supported the verdict that the jury had returned against Annigoni.24

23. United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1996).
24. An even more extreme case reversing a conviction is United States v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638
(5th Cir. 1996), decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which hears
cases from federal courts in states in the south central part of the United States. In this case,
Huey’s attorney used peremptory challenges to strike five black jurors from the jury that would
hear evidence of the drug-related charges against Huey and a co-defendant. Huey’s attorney did
so because he was worried that undercover tape recordings of Huey and his associates that would
be played at trial would show Huey using harsh and offensive racial epithets in referring to
blacks. Both the prosecutor and Huey’s co-defendant objected to the peremptories, but the judge
allowed Huey’s attorney to remove the black jurors. Id. at 639-41.
On appeal, the appellate court ruled that these challenges on the basis of race were
improper and should not have been permitted. The result, the court concluded, had to be a new
trial. But not just a new trial for the co-defendant, but a new trial for the defendant Huey as well.
Notice that it was Mr. Huey’s counsel who violated the rights of the prospective jurors, that the
government and counsel for the co-defendant pointed this out to the lawyer and the court, that as
a result of the improper challenges Mr. Huey had a jury more favorable to him than that to which
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I apologize for going into some detail on some appellate cases having to do
with possible errors during jury selection. My point has been to show you that
it is not just trial lawyers that place tremendous emphasis on jury selection and
selecting the “right jurors,” but appellate courts emphasize jury selection as
well. What you see is a system that believes that who ends up on the jury can
alter the result at trial, no matter how overwhelming the evidence may be.
D. Our Ambivalence About Juries
We have very complicated trial procedures in the United States. Some of
the complicated rules that govern our trial system, notably our very
complicated rules of evidence, are a reflection of our concern about juries and
whether they are capable of performing the task they are supposed to perform.
Our attitude toward juries is deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, we profess
confidence in the wisdom of juries, yet at other times we treat jurors more like
children and keep information away from them because we fear that they
cannot properly evaluate it. We often say that American juries are supposed to
represent “a cross-section of the community.” Yet we select juries in such a
way that cross-sectional values are completely undermined. We are at times
proud of the power of American juries “to nullify the law” and reach verdicts
based on the jurors’ own personal sense of justice. Yet at other times we are
plainly frightened of this power. Jury nullification of the law is a growing
concern in the United States. 25
Jury reform is very much on our minds in the United States and there have
been some steps toward reform.26 But we have not faced up to many of the
hard issues. Our system is premised on the belief that any citizen can perform
the job of the juror and qualifications for service on a jury are minimal. But an
American courtroom is an intimidating place, even for lawyers. To expect
citizens to enter the jury room and perform their task well with minimal
training and little experience is optimistic. Most jurors have never served on a
jury before and have never done anything like what they are being asked to do.
Citizens with important daily responsibilities will often not be able to serve on
juries. For example, many people cannot serve on a jury if the trial is going to
last a week or two. Some, such as small shopkeepers, hourly workers, or
single parents, simply may not be able to afford to serve. While others, such as
he was entitled (and the government had a jury that was less favorable), yet Mr. Huey received a
new trial.
25. Whether or not nullification of the law is good thing, there are scholarly articles in
prestigious journals advocating jury nullification of the law. See Paul Butler, Racially Based
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). There are
also political groups urging that juries be instructed about the power of juries to nullify the law.
See Reynolds Holding, Group Tries to Sway Jurors, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 11, 1995, at B1.
26. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
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teachers, nurses, scientists, and executives may not be able to leave their jobs
to serve if the trial lasts more than a few days. Many will be permitted to
avoid jury service by the trial judge if they explain the hardship service would
impose on them or those around them. (This assumes that they show up for
jury service in the first place; today a substantial percentage of those called for
jury service ignore the summons.)
For a variety of reasons, including the way peremptory challenges are
exercised and the limited numbers of citizens who want or who can afford to
serve on a jury, it has been observed that jurors in the United States are very
ordinary citizens at a time when the evidence that they are supposed to
analyze, such as DNA evidence, is becoming increasingly complicated. On
top of that, American juries get less help in performing their job than juries in
other common law countries. In the United States, unlike other common law
countries, judges usually do not summarize or review the evidence with the
jury at the end of the trial.27 While American judges initially had this power,
many jurisdictions under the sway of American populism passed statutes that
expressly took this power away from judges.28 But even where judges are
permitted to summarize the evidence, such as our federal courts, judges rarely
exercise that power.29 When one considers that the argumentation in American
courtrooms can be extreme and there are fewer restraints on advocacy than
exist in other common law systems, I think that there is good reason to
question whether the American jury is being given sufficient help.
E.

A Warning About the Relationship Between Procedure and Punishment

I want to move from a discussion of juries and jury selection to a more
general point about the troubling relationship between our complicated system
of procedure and the growing harshness of penal law in the American criminal
justice system. Maybe the problem that I am going to describe is only a
problem in the United States. I hope that is the case. But I worry that what is
happening in the United States may happen in other countries.
As suggested above, we have a very complicated and expensive trial
system. Though our crime rate remains far higher than that in most other
western countries, we require, in theory, juries in almost all criminal cases.
But what happens when reality meets theory and the system cannot begin to
27. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall
and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118
F.R.D. 161 (1988).
28. Judge Weinstein lists Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia as all having statutes which forbid
judges from summarizing the evidence for jurors. Id. at 188 nn. 17-18.
29. Id. at 169-70.
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provide these rights in all but a small percentage of our criminal cases? Or put
another way, what happens in a system when prosecutors and judges do not
want many cases going to trial? Put bluntly, the system needs to find ways to
work around its trial system and to pressure defendants to give up their
constitutional protections. One way to do that is to threaten defendants with
increased punishment if they dare to go to trial.
What I am suggesting here is that it is not a coincidence that over the last
ten or fifteen years there has been a tremendous increase in the harshness of
criminal law in the United States. What we have witnessed in the United
States has been criminal laws steadily increasing the punishments that
defendants will receive if convicted.30 These statutes increasing punishments
are of different types. Sometimes the range of punishment for a crime is
increased so that a defendant may face a very high maximum punishment if the
judge feels it is appropriate for the crime.
Another way that sentences have grown harsher is through statutes that
restrict the sentencing options of the sentencing judge by requiring that a
specific minimum sentence be imposed on anyone convicted of the particular
crime. Thus, for example, someone caught in possession of a specified amount
of cocaine might face a mandatory minimum punishment of five years or even
ten years. This is a very powerful weapon for prosecutors because it does
more than threaten a defendant with a harsh punishment should the defendant
be convicted; it promises the defendant that such a sentence will be imposed
and there is nothing a trial judge can do even if the sentence seems too harsh
for the offender or the offense.
Another type of statute promising a defendant a harsh sentencing result if
the defendant is convicted under the statute is what we refer to as “habitual
offender” statutes or in some jurisdictions, such as California, “three-strikes”
statutes. These statutes vary from state to state. Many states have two or three
versions of these statutes. A typical habitual offender statute provides that if a
defendant is found guilty of the crime with which he has been charged and, in
addition, the jury finds that he has been previously convicted of separate
crimes on three prior occasions, the defendant must be sentenced to life in
prison.
Statutes with high mandatory minimum punishments and habitual offender
statutes offer tremendous advantages to prosecutors because they put
tremendous pressure on defendants to waive their rights and avoid trial by
agreeing to a plea bargain. There is no tradition of mandatory prosecution in
the United States as there often is in continental systems and broad

30. The growing harshness of American sentencing laws and the political pressure that have
encouraged this development have been the subject of book length studies. See, e.g., KATHARINE
BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY (1997); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996).
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prosecutorial discretion in the filing and selection of criminal charges is a
central part of our justice system. Thus a defendant need not be charged as an
habitual offender even if he has prior convictions that would make him eligible
to be so charged. The way it often works in practice is that a prosecutor will
often agree not to file an habitual offender charge, if the defendant agrees to
plea guilty to his present charged crime and accept a certain sentence.
It would work similarly in the case of a statute with a high mandatory
minimum sentence. The prosecutor would agree to a plea bargain to a lesser
charge that would permit the defendant to avoid a high mandatory minimum—
if the defendant agreed not to contest his guilt at trial.
The leading Supreme Court case on plea bargaining, Bordenkircher v.
Hayes,31 shows how the system works today and the pressures that these harsh
statutes put on defendants. In Hayes, the defendant was charged with burglary
and the prosecutor offered the defendant a plea bargain. If the defendant pled
guilty to the burglary and avoided trial, the prosecution would agree to a
sentence of five years in prison. But if the defendant did not accept that plea
bargain, the prosecutor warned that he would file an additional charge against
the defendant charging him with being a habitual offender. If convicted of the
burglary and of being an habitual offender, he would receive a mandatory life
sentence.
The defendant chose to exercise his right to a trial. The defendant was
convicted of the burglary and of being an habitual offender with the result that
he received a life sentence. Notice that the prosecutor would have been willing
to limit the defendant’s sentence to five years in prison if the defendant had
pled guilty to the burglary. But by exercising his constitutional right to have
the case proven at trial, the defendant got a life sentence and there was nothing
the judge could do to soften the blow.
There are many things that the Court might have said about this harsh
result. The most obvious might be to ask how can it be just for a prosecutor to
think that a sentence of five years was appropriate for the offender and the
offense and then charge the defendant in such a way that he receives a life
sentence for exercising his constitutional right to trial? Standard 3-3.9 of the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice states that a prosecutor “should not
bring . . . charges greater in number or degree . . . than are necessary to fairly
reflect the gravity of the offense.”32 If the prosecutor thought that a sentence
of five years would sufficiently reflect the punishment appropriate for the
burglary, wouldn’t adding a charge mandating a life sentence seem to violate
that provision?

31. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
32. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, § 3-3.9(f) (3rd ed. 1993).
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But the Majority did not see the issue as raising difficult issues about the
scope of prosecutorial discretion or the possible ethical limits that should
control prosecutorial power. The Supreme Court upheld the life sentence in an
opinion that basically says: “This is the way plea bargaining works.” The
opinion can be criticized on many grounds, but not for its honesty.
While harsh sentencing laws have always existed in the United States,
what is changing is the number of these statutes. What these statutes do is
effectively shift sentencing power, which has traditionally been vested in
judges, from the judges and place that power under the control of prosecutors.
In our system, prosecutors are not judicial figures and they often see it as being
in the public interest to keep cases from going to trial. Habitual offender
statutes as well as statutes with high mandatory minimums are attractive to
prosecutors because they put pressure, sometimes extreme pressure, on
defendants to accept plea bargains and waive their rights to trial.
Now I do not want to appear to be saying in this article that our jury
system causes harsh punishments, or, even more generally, that our
complicated and expensive system of criminal procedure has led to statutes
threatening very harsh punishments. Crime and criminal justice are political
issues in the United States for many reasons and legislators often like to vote
for harsh statutes as a way of showing voters that they are not “soft on crime.”
But at the same time, I do not think that it is a coincidence that a country with a
very expensive and an extremely complicated trial system—and one in which
there are doubts about its reliability—would encourage mechanisms that would
allow the system to avoid trials. The result is unsettling; at a time when our
crime rate for violent crime is decreasing, our prison population continues to
grow.33
One of the main motivations the Supreme Court offered in Duncan v.
Louisiana for imposing the requirement of jury trials on the states was the
Court’s belief that juries serve as an important restraint on “the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor.”34 I suggest that our jury system has ended up a very
poor restraint on prosecutorial power and may even have indirectly increased
the power of prosecutors.

33. The Bureau of Justice Statistics in the Department of Justice reports that at the end of
1999, there were 1,366,721 inmates in federal and state prisons. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONS STATISTICS: SUMMARY FINDINGS, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm (last revised Nov. 14, 2001).
34. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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